Eugenics is a loaded term. Ask most people what they think of when
they hear the word eugenics and it would seem that the most common thought
process nearly always leads to Nazism and the holocaust. Much of the objection
to eugenics in academia and the general population stems from its uses in the
early twentieth century; and for good reason. Questions on the modern day
morality of eugenics almost always end in its rejection based on the visions of
extreme horror and oppression that it carries (Caplan et al., 1999). Arguments against the morality
of eugenics often stem from the idea of coercion and force, and the application
of a third party influence on what is the perfect image of humanity (Savulescu, 2005). Indeed Nazi Germany is the most
salient illustration of this point, the forcing at a governmental level of an
image of the perfect society onto a mostly unwilling population through policy.
The purpose of this essay is to explore eugenics, in both its early form and
modern day equivalent, and to rationally assess whether there is a true
difference between eugenics at the beginning of the twentieth century and
eugenics now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The differences
between genetic manipulation for the benefit of society as a whole and
manipulation for the benefit of the individual will be explored; as will its
morality and practical feasibility. Some areas of eugenics may be considered to
be practical in their application, but not morally justifiable and vice versa;
it is the aim of this essay to draw such conclusions in such a way that those
conclusions drawn are from a scientific and objective viewpoint, free from the
personal bias and morality of the reader and writer alike. This essay will be
divided into three sections, firstly a historical overview of eugenics,
secondly on the practicality of eugenics and how its practicality is
intrinsically linked to its morality, and finally on its morality in modern day
society as well as the potential future of the field.
What is Eugenics?
After the dawn of Darwinism and the first steps towards an
understanding of human evolution eugenics began to adopt an evolutionary
framework. Sir Francis Galton began to organise his ideas on human evolution
and made the claim that society must prevent itself from “regression towards
mediocrity” as he considered human society to be interrupting and even
preventing the mechanisms of natural selection from working (Galton, 2001). Eugenics as an idea, as
mentioned above, is often always associated with Nazi Germany however 1930’s
Germany was not the only country who ran such programmes. Examples of eugenic
policy could be found throughout European countries as well as the Unites
States. Eugenics at the turn of the 20th century is closely linked
to ideas about race as well as being interwoven into thinking about the control
of populations and social and racial hygiene (Dikotter, 1998). Eugenics as a school of thought
was discussed and debated widely amongst academics and intellectuals across the
world and is not just placed solely within the confines of far right
conservative thinking but also with liberal thinkers as well (Dikotter, 1998). It was believed to be a morally
justified way of systematically improving the heredity of human populations,
with many academics expressing distaste with the actions taking place in Nazi
Germany but praising any effort to advance humanity (Dikotter, 1998).
Eugenics in the 21st Century: A Wolf in Sheep’s
Clothing?
The debate over the moral
justifiability of eugenics is one that is continuing today. Fierce debates
between academics, ethicists, bioethicists and those in the medical profession
are raging over whether modern day eugenic practices can even be labelled as
such and whether or not humanity has a social responsibility to improve the
health and heredity of populations. The debate itself has become increasingly
more complex as the human genome began to be mapped and the great advancements
in genetics have occurred. Whilst some claim that modern day eugenic teachings,
or genetic counselling as it is often referred to, is morally justified to
improve the quality of life of the individuals who choose to adopt such ideas (Savulescu, 2005); others claim that “new eugenics”
is merely a change in the tactics and packaging that echo from the early 20th
century (Hansen et al., 2008). As highlighted by Allen Buchanan
in his book “Beyond Humanity?” the idea of enhancement through such things as
biotechnologies or genetic counselling is a polarising idea that often leaves
people enthralled or filled with dread. Posing an argument strongly in favour
of the use of biological enhancements, Buchanan states quite strongly that much
of the anti-enhancement movement is wrong in its assertions (Buchanan, 2011). Those who are against the idea
of biomedical enhancements and genetic counselling often claim that those
offering such a thing draw distinctions between what is a “fit and able” body
and what is an “unfit” body, an idea based functionally on the fallacy there is
a fixed line that separates the able bodied from the infirm or the disabled (Hansen et al., 2008). Hansen makes the controversial
statement that modern day debates between geneticists and bioethicists are a
chilling echo of similar debates on life worthiness in Nazi Germany. He further
claims that contemporary genetic counselling, medicine and bioethics are
frequently flippant about the basic and universal human rights afforded to the
disabled, and are often dual intentioned; with one hand attempting to spare
individuals distress and aid decision making and with the other hand attempting
to spare the state costs and demands on the health care system (Hansen et al., 2008). Buchanan and his contemporaries
disagree with much of the statements that anti-enhancement writers throw into
the debate. It is stated by Buchanan that the anti-enhancement arguments are
often empty and reasonable debate is replaced by seemingly impenetrable
rhetoric and lacks much needed empirical credence, with many writers using
sweeping generalisations that lack a fundamental clarity of argument (Buchanan, 2011). Buchanan goes a long way, with
often strong and emotive language, to refute and prove that genetic enhancement
is in fact a moral imperative. There are concerns over what will happen to
humanity if such genetic enhancements actually come to fruition, to quote
Francis Fukuyama “Once we are able to, in effect, breed people with saddles on
their bodies, and others with boots and spurs?” (Fukuyama, 2002); a statement that highlights the
problem of a world where there may well be two distinct categories of human
being, the enhanced and the normal. Buchanan mentions that many people fear a
morally bifurcated society, in which those that can afford expensive
enhancements will have a decisive economic and moral advantage over those who
are worse off (Buchanan, 2011).
For many there is a fear that modern day genetic advancements and
medicine will be an unwelcome return of a “backdoor to eugenics” (Duster, 2003). This notion is addressed using a
concept coined by the French Philosopher Michel Foucault, known as
governmentality (Foucault, 1982), in a piece by Thomas Lemke.
Governmentality is a thought process that links the political strategies of the
state to the individuals capacity to control and mediate itself and the
mobilisation of truth that results in the formation of moralistic subject
positions (Foucault, 1982). Lemke states that much of the
debate surrounding what can be considered modern day eugenic thoughts stem from
the historico-political continuity or discontinuity between the old and new
eugenic movements (Proctor, 1992, Paul, 1994). The advancements made in
genetics since the peak of the eugenics movement in the early 20th
century have been vast and there is no longer the polar opposites of nature
versus nurture, or of genetic determinism versus the environment; instead it is
now understood that there is a complex relationship between genes and the
environments and that often more than one single gene code for a particular
physical expression (Lemke, 2005). The advancements in genetics
have highlighted, credibly, that gene mutations are a natural phenomenon and
are spread far and wide in any population, and so this renders the older
eugenic arguments of strength through the purification of the gene pool
obsolete and downright absurd; a point that was articulately translated from
German to English by Lemke (Propping, 1992). Molecular biology and science in
the modern day, along with genetic engineering, have become, as their main
function, mere informational services that regard the DNA molecule as a code
that can be read and potentially one that can be rewritten (Kay, 2000). Lemke goes on to claim that for
a person to identify potential risks genetically within individuals, does not
necessarily mean that they serve to identify an unavoidable biological fate and
it also does not highlight a potentially uncontrollable situation. What genetic
screening does provide is a field of vision that was previously unattainable,
the field is that of intervention; individuals are now able to monitor their
genetic codes and identify pathways that could potentially lead to chronic
pathological states (Lemke, 2005). Indeed research has already
shown that there are genetic factors involved in the regulation of several
diseases, such as heart disease, cancer and diabetes (Clark, 1997). Whether or not such behaviours
constitute eugenic thought is of further debate, in fact some have argued that
if such an action as genetic screening is inherently eugenic then so is the act
of choosing not to screen because it involves a normative decision. With the
act of not screening for potential genetic risk factors it is argued that this
is one option of many, but still a very real one that involves the decision not
to interfere (Kitcher, 1996). Genetic screening itself has
caused great controversy amongst many different groups. Medical literature has
seen an enormous surge in interest in genetic risks and as such a large amount
of discourse has been presented. The impact on the views of pregnancy have been
astounding with some suggesting that nearly all pregnancies can be regarded as
risk or tentative pregnancies (Rothman, 1987). The discussion soon becomes a
question of whether such actions can be considered to be eugenic in their
thoughts, and whether such actions can be morally justifiable. When comparing
to what is considered to be old eugenics, then such actions are not even on the
same parallel. The discourse on risk in pregnancy depends solely on the
individual autonomy of those involved and by no means does the authority of the
state enter into such an equation (Lemke, 2005). It is observed that in the place
of state control there is instead “apparatuses of risk, aiming at the
productive enhancement of the individual human capital in the name of
self-determination and choice” (Lemke, 2005). Medical experts only now seek to
advise and inform the individual so as to attempt to assure that “sound”
genetic decisions are made. The rise of “risk” as a label for many individuals
has allowed for the debate on the morality of genetic tampering and screening
to become more lucid, as the construction of risk individuals has made
moralising on behaviours that seem deviant in nature easier as well as allowing
for the assignment of guilt and responsibility (Douglas, 1990).
The moral advantage to the analysis of the genome and genetic
diagnostics is that it relies much less on genetic determinism, with relations
to genes and diseases; what it does instead is provide individuals with a
framework to build a reflexive relationship between the requirements of society
and individual risk profiles (Lemke, 2004). The fundamental difference
between new and old eugenics or genetics is that an individuals autonomy to
make a decision for themselves is greatly upheld, the older view of genetic
determinism in the relationship between genotype and phenotype makes this
position far more difficult to keep up (Lemke, 2005).
In terms of genetic intervention there are two perspectives to
consider, one from a public health angle and the other from a personal choice
angle. From a public health perspective the aim is to establish a cost-benefit
analysis, similar to those used by the state when assessing the economic
viability of capital projects, one that involves the avoidance of harm to
groups and confers benefits (Buchanan et al., 2000); the assumption here is that this
is the most appropriate manner to assess the moral viability of using genetic
interventions. It goes as far as to even recognise an ethical framework
surrounding the application of scientific knowledge and technology, but it
assumes that good and practical ethical reasoning is utilitarian in nature; as
in the greatest good for the greatest number of people (Buchanan et al., 2000). The issue is that the public
health perspective has been a dominant shadow over eugenics and has produced
often disastrous consequences and unspeakable inhumanity, simply by assuming
that it is morally justifiable to discard the moral rights of the minority in
favour of the greater good for the majority; however this is simply not the
case in modern society (Buchanan et al., 2000). The personal choice model is
generally seen as far more compatible with modern society and is absent from
the overtones of the oppressive state that inevitably come with thoughts on
eugenics ideas. Genetic services in the modern medical profession are merely
private goods provided for private consumption of the individual. The choice to
use such interventions is, as mentioned previously, up to the choice of the
individual (Buchanan et al., 2000). However the latter perspective
is not without its critics who fear that new genetics is exclusionary and still
just as dangerous as old genetics. Some argue that the worst product of genetic
interventions is genetic discrimination; such examples have been permanently
etched into history as a warning to humanity in the present. It is now argued
by some that discrimination and eugenics have become depersonalised and
privatised by allowing the individual the right to choose for themselves (Ho, 1998). Ho argues
further that this form of eugenic practice is even more dangerous to society
than previous incarnations as it cannot be properly opposed, as it is promoted
under the guise of free choice and scientific progress; a term he often uses to
describe such actions is “bad science and big business” (Ho, 1998). As Ho
eloquently states “if screening is eventually going to be applied to
‘predisposing’ genes and to genes whose connection to dubious conditions is
increasingly tenuous, we shall slip insensibly and quietly into an era of human
genetic engineering dictated purely by corporate interests” (Ho, 1998), a future
that he claims will lead to the exploitation of those weakest in society for
profitable gains. Such an outcome is discussed by Buchanan, and his colleagues,
in their detailed book on the ethics of genetic intervention. They claim that
the argument that new genetics is exclusionary and silently dangerous is one of
the biggest and most compelling arguments against the morality of genetic
intervention. New genetics is seen by many members of the disability rights
movement as a proxy for the exclusion of those individuals who are in
possession of so called “bad genes” from their most basic of human rights; the
right to equal respect and consideration (Buchanan et al., 2000). It is argued by disability
rights movements that new genetics can be used to deny those who are victims of
“defective” genes the right to be classes as persons with the same moral worth
as those who are not unfortunate enough to possess such genes (Buchanan et al., 2000). It is this that has caused many
to suggest that new genetics is a harrowing echo of its oppressive predecessor.
However Buchanan refutes such a claim by suggesting that genetic science is now
no longer about service to a particular nationality or “race”, and lacks the
same exclusionary or particularistic nature as old eugenics; rather it is now
used to service humanity as a whole, which he claims is a moral imperative for
all science (Buchanan et al., 2000). A rather salient point on the
morality of genetic intervention is one made by the disability rights movement
is that new genetics does not seek to change society to fit those individuals
who suffer from a disability, they instead seek to change individuals to fit
the society (Buchanan et al., 2000). Disability rights activists
claim that many of those who claim that it is morally and ethically correct to
intervene genetically in those individuals at risk of disability are
fundamentally wrong in their definition of disability (Amundson and Tresky, 2007). Disability is defined as a
socially constructed disorder, with there being a dichotomy, in the biomedical
definitions, between disability and impairment. Impairment is defined as the
biomedical category in which an individual is considered a deviation from the
norm and disability is defined as the disadvantage to the impaired individual
of encountering environmental barriers that limit their participation (Amundson and Tresky, 2007). It is this distinction that has
been described as “the leading theoretical achievement of the disability rights
movement” (Wasserman et al., 2005), and it has been argued that the
lack of understanding of this distinction amongst bioethicists and those who
are pro-genetic intervention leads much of their arguments to be fruits of the
poison tree. Furthermore there has been presented an argument that claims that
it flies in the face of human nature to even consider genetic interventions or
modifications of any kind, and there in lies what is truly amoral about genetic
science. However it can be said, and it is done so by many, that there is
nothing inherently wrong with altering or destroying human nature because of
the fact that human nature contains both the good and the bad aspects of
humanity. It is because of this that altering human nature does not necessarily
result in the loss of humanity’s ability to make judgements on what is
perceived as good, instead it is because we possess a conception of such a
thing as good that it allows us to evaluate human nature more closely (Buchanan, 2008). Buchanan claims that appealing
to human nature does not illuminate any great issue in this debate but rather
it obscures the debate over genetic enhancement (Buchanan, 2008).
Conclusion:
It is abundantly clear that the eugenics movement of the early
twentieth century was morally abhorrent and unjustifiable. From a purely
scientific basis, it was often based on shoddy and now rejected pseudoscience;
pseudoscience that the field of anthropology has struggled to come to terms
with and shed. The shadow of social Darwinism, race hygiene and the forced
authority of state visions of the perfect society looms over the modern day
equivalent and invokes strong emotion, backlash and fear over what the
consequences of genetic engineering, intervention and counselling may bring to
modern day society. Both those in favour and those against modern day genetic
science have produced a vast amount of discourse that is often emotive and
strong in its conviction that the other is morally wrong. On one hand there are
those who suggest that it is our moral obligation and imperative to improve the
well-being of individuals through the autonomy of individual choice, and that
modern day genetic science only seeks to inform and advise those who could be
potentially affected. On the other hand there are those who argue that such a
path is dangerous in its application and morally bankrupt as it may potentially
lead to a promotion of discrimination of those who are deemed to have a genetic
disposition towards disability. In terms of the practical feasibility of
eugenics in both the modern day and at the beginning of the twentieth century
it can be argued that yes, it is very much a feasible option. Those states that
adopted such schemes in the early twentieth century forced their image of
perfection onto an often unwilling population and it was perfectly feasible for
them to do so as the general populous had no choice. In modern day society the
advances in technology and the theoretical standpoints of those who support
genetic science have made it readily available and feasible for individuals to
consume. The moral justifiability of such actions is a debate that is much more
divided in its discourse than its practical feasibility. In terms of the early
twentieth century form of eugenics, as mentioned above, the moral
justifiability is clear; it simply is not moral for such actions to take place.
However for the modern day equivalent, drawing a solid conclusion is a lot more
difficult. It would appear that for the purposes of this essay that views on
state control must be examined, if you believe that there should be an absence
of state control and decisions on your lives and the lives of those you bring
into the world should be left to the autonomy of the individual then it can be
said that it is morally justifiable to allow for individuals to provide the
best possible outcome for their children. When examining the benefits to
society however it can be argued to the contrary, that it is morally bankrupt
to attempt to enact changes in individuals using the guise of good science when
it is abundantly clear that society needs an overhaul in its values. The
utilitarian approach that so many seem to adopt, simply fails to take into account
that individuals are not statistics but human beings and so it should not be a
societal universal to force change upon others.
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